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Climate Policy’s Uncertain Outcomes for Households:  
The Role of Complex Allocation Schemes in Cap and Trade 
Joshua Blonz, Dallas Burtraw, and Margaret A. Walls 
Abstract 
Uncertainty is a fundamental characteristic of climate change. This paper focuses on uncertainty in the 
implementation of climate policy, especially as it affects the level and distribution of the burden on households 
that results from the allocation of emissions allowances. We examine the Waxman–Markey bill (H.R. 2454), 
introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives in 2009, with bookend scenarios labeled optimistic and 
pessimistic. The scenarios illustrate varied outcomes associated with allocations to electricity local distribution 
companies, investments in energy efficiency, and technology development. We introduce a third scenario for 
comparison, which allocates a substantial portion of allowance value directly to households as lump-sum 
payments. We find the average net household burden in 2016 in the optimistic scenario to be $133 with a CO2  
allowance price of $13.19. In the pessimistic scenario, the net household burden rises to $418, with an 
allowance price of $23.41. While the burden varies by income group, the relative impacts stay roughly the 
same in the optimistic and pessimistic cases, thus the uncertainty in average burdens does not carry over to 
uncertainty in the distribution of those burdens. Both scenarios impose the greatest burden as a percentage of 
income on middle-income households. Allocation of allowance value directly back to households as a lump-
sum payment imposes an average net household burden of $206 with much less uncertainty in outcome; the 
distributional impacts are highly progressive.  
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Climate Policy’s Uncertain Outcomes for Households:  
The Role of Complex Allocation Schemes in Cap and Trade 
Joshua Blonz, Dallas Burtraw, and Margaret A. Walls∗ 
Introduction 
As the U.S. draws nearer to adopting a national climate policy, the allocation of emissions 
allowances in a cap-and-trade program has become a front and center issue in the policy debate. With 
estimates of allowance value at approximately $100 billion per year initially, rising to $230 billion 
according to the Energy Information Agency (EIA) (2009a) and even higher according to other 
studies, the stakes are high. Many vested interests have lobbied for a dedicated slice of the allowance 
pie, and this has led to detailed and complex allocation schemes in current bills in Congress. The 
front-runners—H.R. 2454, the Waxman–Markey bill, which came out of the House of 
Representatives in June 2009; S. 1733, the Kerry–Boxer bill, introduced in the Senate in September 
2009; and S. 2877, the Cantwell–Collins bill introduced in the Senate in December 2009—have 
many provisions for allocating allowances among various programs, industry groups, and consumers. 
Studies by economists have shown that the allocation of allowances can be a key determinant 
of both the welfare costs of a cap-and-trade program and the distribution of impacts across 
households. A number of studies have emphasized, for example, that using the revenues generated 
from an allowance auction (or a carbon tax) to reduce pre-existing distortionary taxes in the 
economy, such as income and payroll taxes, can improve the overall efficiency of the program 
(Parry, Williams, and Goulder 1999; Goulder et al. 1999). On the other hand, several studies have 
shown that reducing payroll or income taxes in combination with a carbon price is likely to be 
regressive, benefiting high-income households more than low-income households (Burtraw, 
Sweeney, and Walls 2009). Giving allowances away for free to existing emitters, so-called 
“grandfathering” of allowances, has also been shown to be regressive because the benefit flows to 
shareholders who are predominantly in higher income groups (Parry, 2004; Dinan and Rogers 2002; 
Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 2009). In a recent paper (Burtraw, Walls, and Blonz 2009), we 
highlighted the impacts of giving allowances away for free to electricity local distribution companies 
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(LDCs), the regulated entities that provide electricity to end users. This approach is a feature of H.R. 
2454, accounting for 30 percent of allowances, with another 9 percent allocated to natural gas LDCs; 
S. 1733 has similar features. Our results, suggest this approach has implications for both the welfare 
costs of the policy and the distribution of impacts across households.1  
This extensive cap-and-trade literature is instructive in understanding the implications of 
various allocation provisions. However, the current bills in the U.S. Congress are far more 
complicated than the arrangements analyzed by existing studies. H.R. 2454 has over 20 provisions 
for allocating allowances. The bill has money flowing directly to industry, such as to domestic 
refineries and so-called “energy-intensive, trade-exposed industries”. Money goes to consumers, via 
direct rebates for low-income households and via electricity and natural gas LDCs. Money is also 
targeted to support a variety of funds to address adaptation to climate change, including extensive 
technology development, renewable energy, energy efficiency measures, and some international 
programs. It is unclear how all this money will eventually make its way to households. Language in 
the bill is vague, for one thing, and even for those less ambiguous provisions, the degree of 
uncertainty in implementation and in market outcomes is substantial. 
In this paper, we analyze the allocation provisions of H.R. 2454 and attempt to determine 
how the various allocation schemes will flow through to households. We focus on 2016 as the year 
when all of the main provisions of the bill come into effect, and construct an optimistic and a 
pessimistic scenario for the LDC provisions and for the various energy efficiency and technology 
development provisions in the bill. These three sets of provisions account for approximately 43 
percent of allowances in 2016, introducing a wide range of possible outcomes for the burden that 
households will face. Some of this uncertainty stems from the familiar uncertainty associated with 
technology development, but most of it arises from questions about how the policy would be 
implemented.  
Additionally, we assume that government’s own energy costs will increase, although no 
revenue is set aside in H.R. 2454 to pay for it. Without such an allocation, this increase in 
government costs would constitute a hidden tax, which we assume to be 14 percent of total allowance 
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revenue based on estimates from the Congressional Budget Office (2009a). The magnitude of 
government costs changes with the allowance price, which varies across scenarios.  
Our optimistic and pessimistic scenarios are distinguished in the degree to which they affect 
allowance prices and the efficiency of the program. In the optimistic scenario, we assume LDC 
allocations end up reducing fixed charges on monthly electricity bills for some customers. In 
contrast, in the pessimistic scenario, the LDC allocations reduce variable charges for all customers. 
The efficiency consequences under these scenarios depend on the degree to which the policy results 
in a weaker price signal to consumers. If consumers receive a weak price signal, there will be less of 
a behavioral change by end users of energy. This will lead to more emissions in this sector and will 
require greater emissions reductions from other sectors of the economy, which raises the allowance 
price and the overall cost of the program. This is the sense in which the efficiency implications of the 
policy may depend on the allocation of allowances.  Reducing fixed charges, as in our optimistic 
scenario, preserves the incentive features of pricing carbon and is thus more efficient.  
Our pessimistic scenario also assumes the money spent on energy efficiency and technology 
development provisions is simply wasted, i.e., that no additional emissions reductions are obtained 
with the money dedicated to these efforts. In our optimistic case, we accept the opinion of some 
experts that society can benefit more from government investments in various energy efficiency and 
clean technology development programs than from the efforts of the private market (McKinsey and 
Company 2007). Among the expected benefits would be additional reductions in CO2 emissions, a 
diminished burden on other sectors of the economy, and lowered allowance prices. Again, the 
allocation of allowances can affect overall efficiency of the policy. In addition, household electricity 
bills would be reduced as electricity consumption fell. 
These two sets of extreme assumptions make a big difference in the costs of climate policy. 
We find that the net household burden – the consumer surplus loss net of the value of allowances – 
for an average household in 2016 is three times higher in our pessimistic scenario than in our 
optimistic one. Under the pessimistic assumptions, the average household incurs a net loss of $418; 
under optimistic assumptions, the loss is only $133. The CO2 allowance price in the optimistic 
scenario is only $13.19/ton, while it is more than $10 higher, $23.43/ton, in the pessimistic scenario. 
The difference between these two cases is demonstrated by calculating Shapley values to show which 
of the optimistic assumptions are responsible for what portion of the cost savings to households 
(Roth 1988). 
While uncertainty characterizes the difference between the magnitudes of the costs in the 
Waxman-Markey scenarios, the shape of the distribution is similar across the two H.R. 2454 Resources for the Future  Blonz, Burtraw, and Walls 
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scenarios. The allocation scheme in the H.R. 2454 bill is progressive over the bottom four-fifths of 
the income distribution under either set of assumptions. The average household in the lowest income 
quintile enjoys a net gain (negative burden) in both scenarios and households in the higher quintiles 
incur relatively more of the burden of the policy through the fourth quintile. The fifth quintile incurs 
a slightly smaller burden than the fourth as a percentage of income because of how some of the 
provisions pass through to shareholders, which are predominantly in the highest income quintile. 
Additional analysis was conducted using consumption quintiles, which are often used as proxies for 
lifetime income quintiles. The results were similar to those with annual income quintiles, but with all 
three policies being progressive across the entire consumption distribution. This finding highlights 
some of the complicated ways in which the provisions impact households.  
For comparison purposes, we also assess a simple allocation scheme in which 75 percent of 
allowances are auctioned and returned to households as a lump-sum payment per person, i.e., a so-
called cap-and-dividend approach.2 The average net household burden in this case is $206 and the 
allowance price is $17.37/ton, so the results lie in between our optimistic and pessimistic scenarios 
for H.R. 2454. With no LDC allocation, there is no distortion in electricity markets in the cap-and-
dividend scenario and this helps to reduce costs and the allowance price. On the other hand, with no 
allocation to energy efficiency and technology programs, there is no possibility of reaping those 
benefits that we obtained in our optimistic scenario. This is balanced against the possibility that the 
energy efficiency and technology programs might not benefit households, and the revenue might 
essentially be lost. The cap-and-dividend approach is progressive across the entire income 
distribution—the lump-sum return of revenue on a per capita basis benefits low and middle-income 
households relatively more. 
Our results are not meant to be precise representations of the outcomes under proposed 
climate legislation. Rather, they are illustrative of the range of possibilities in a cap-and-trade 
program that has a complex, multi-faceted allocation scheme. Because of the uncertainty in how the 
separate provisions affect energy use, emissions, and household welfare, it is difficult to say exactly 
what the impacts of the legislation will be. Complex allocations and uncertain outcomes also make it 
difficult to protect certain vulnerable groups because allowance value and initial welfare losses 
remain undetermined. In contrast, a simple scheme such as embodied in the cap-and-dividend 
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approach has more predictable and straightforward impacts on average burden and the distribution of 
that burden across income groups. 
In the next section, we provide a review of the literature on the economic impacts of climate 
policy on households. We then describe our data and methodology, lay out the specific provisions of 
the Waxman–Markey bill, explain how we account for these provisions in our model, and present our 
results for both average net household burdens and the distribution across quintiles. 
Literature Review 
Several studies have evaluated the impacts of alternative allocation schemes in a carbon cap-
and-trade program. Dinan and Rogers (2002) find that distributional effects hinge crucially on 
whether allowances are initially distributed free of charge to incumbent emitters (grandfathered) or 
auctioned and whether revenues from allowance auctions, or from indirect taxation of allowance 
rents, are used to cut payroll or corporate taxes or to provide lump-sum transfers to households. They 
find grandfathering to be very regressive, as a result of the value flowing through to shareholders 
who are primarily in the upper-income groups. Parry (2004) also obtained this result in a calibrated 
analytical model. In contrast, Dinan and Rogers (2002) find that if allowances are auctioned, with 
revenues returned in equal lump-sum rebates for all households, then the regressivity finding is 
reversed. Using auction revenues to cut payroll or corporate taxes is found to be regressive, though 
less so than grandfathering.  
Metcalf (2009) also analyzes reductions in payroll taxes. Specifically, he looks at a policy 
where revenues from a CO2 tax are used to give each worker in a household a tax credit equal to the 
first $560 of payroll taxes; this would be equivalent to exempting from the payroll tax the first 
$3,660 of wages per worker. He finds that this option leads to approximately equal net impacts, as a 
percentage of income, across income quintiles. An option that couples this rebate with an adjustment 
to Social Security payments that benefits the lowest-income households makes the CO2 policy more 
progressive. Finally, Metcalf compares these options to a lump-sum redistribution of the CO2 tax 
revenues and finds that this last option is the most progressive of all. 
Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls (2009) assess the effects of a cap-and-trade program. They 
examine two cap-and dividend scenarios, one in which dividends are taxed and one in which they are 
not taxed. They also explore three other scenarios: reducing the payroll tax, reducing the personal 
income tax, and expanding the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), which is available for low-income 
households. The authors find that the cap-and-dividend options and the EITC alternative reverse the Resources for the Future  Blonz, Burtraw, and Walls 
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regressivity of carbon pricing. Reducing payroll or income taxes, however, exacerbates the 
regressivity.3  
Most of these studies use data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Expenditure 
Survey (CES), including direct energy expenditures as well as indirect expenditures through the 
purchase of goods and services. Most take a partial equilibrium approach, and focus on expenditures 
as a fraction of income. Some of the studies compare results using a measure of lifetime income, in 
addition to current income. The measure used in most studies as a proxy for lifetime income is 
consumption expenditures. Most consumption taxes, including CO2 taxes or a cap-and-trade 
program, look more regressive on the basis of annual income than on the basis of consumption.4 We 
focus primarily on annual income in this analysis, but also conduct sensitivity analysis using a 
consumption measure. Rausch et al. (2009) use a regionally disaggregated general equilibrium model 
to trace through the impacts of carbon pricing to changes in wages and returns on capital, issues that 
are ignored in the partial equilibrium studies.5 The authors estimate the distributional impacts of a 
carbon pricing policy with seven alternatives for return of revenue to households: a lump-sum 
payment per household; uniform reductions in personal income tax rates, capital income taxes, or 
payroll taxes; a return in proportion to capital income; and two electricity scenarios, one in which 
revenue is returned in proportion to electricity consumption and one that provides a lump-sum 
payment. Results are generally similar to the partial equilibrium findings: lump-sum payments make 
for a progressive policy while reduction in personal income taxes, capital income taxes, or payroll 
taxes is regressive, with payroll tax reductions the least regressive of the three. A large literature in 
environmental economics has argued the efficiency merits of reductions in these kinds of taxes 
(Parry, Williams, and Goulder 1999; Goulder et al. 1999), but Rausch et al. (2009) find the efficiency 
gains to be relatively modest. The authors argue that this is likely a result of the revenue neutrality 
requirement in their model. They fix government revenue relative to GDP at the same level as in the 
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4 Grainger and Kolstad (2009) discuss income measures in more detail and calculate the incidence of carbon pricing using 
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5 The model is a regional version of the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model (Paltsev et al. 
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no-policy scenario, which means that not all carbon pricing revenue is available for recycling 
purposes. In some cases, only about one-half of the revenue is available.  
All of the above studies, with the exception of Rausch et al. (2009), separate the 
distributional impacts from the efficiency costs of the cap-and-trade or carbon tax policy. Thus in 
each case, the price of carbon is the same across alternative allocation schemes.6 The resource cost of 
the policy and the amount of allowance value created are also the same, and all that changes is the 
distribution of that value across sectors of the economy and households. Some allocation schemes 
affect the allowance price, however. The LDC allocation in H.R. 2454 is a case in point. If it leads to 
lower electricity prices than the prices in a full auction scenario, then it alters the costs of the 
program and the size of the allowance pie. Our earlier paper focused on this issue, arguing that 
reductions in variable electricity prices are a likely outcome. We then assessed the additional burden 
on society, and the distribution of that burden across income deciles and regions, compared with a 
full auction coupled with a per capita dividend of allowance value (Burtraw, Walls, and Blonz 2009). 
We calculated that the annual net household burden for an average household would be $157 higher 
under this approach than under cap-and-dividend.7 However, we did not evaluate the full impacts of 
the LDC approach in the context of the entire H.R. 2454 allocation scheme—the exercise that is the 
focus of this paper.8 
Three government studies have analyzed the costs of H.R. 2454 to the U.S. economy, the 
U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration (EIA 2009a), the U.S. 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO 2009b), and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA 
2009). These analyses differ from the aforementioned academic studies in that they analyze only the 
specific provisions detailed in the legislation.  
CBO (2009b) estimates the loss of purchasing power that households will experience in 2020 
to be $160, or 0.2 percent of income, at projected 2010 income levels. The cost, however, varies 
                                                   
6 Rausch et al. (2009) do not change the allowance price across scenarios; essentially, their policy is more like a carbon tax 
with changes in emissions and the size of the allowance pie as a result, but no change in the tax rate or carbon price.  
7 This assumes that allowance value outside the electricity sector is not returned to and does not benefit households. Under 
the other extreme assumption that it all goes to the benefit of households, the difference in net burden for an average 
houshold was estimated to be $36.  
8 Rausch et al. (2009) assess two versions of the LDC allocation scheme, one of which is a subsidy to electricity 
consumption. However, the ultimate impact of the extra electricity consumption in their framework is simply higher 
electricity costs, not additional abatement from other sectors and a concomitant increase in the allowance price as in our 
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greatly over household income levels. They estimate an average household in the lowest income 
quintile will see a net benefit of $125, or 0.7 percent of income, while an average household in the 
highest quintile will experience a cost of $165, or 0.1 percent of income. The middle-income quintile 
will incur the most significant cost of this policy, with an average cost of $310, or 0.6 percent of 
income, per household.  
The CBO analysis allocates 31 percent of the total value of allowances to households, while 
businesses receive 44 percent of the value. The federal government and state and local governments 
receive 18 percent of allowance value, and the remaining 7 percent of allowance value is sent 
overseas to fund projects, such as reducing deforestation and adapting to climate change. Of the 31 
percent allocated to households, 15 percent is given directly to households for low-income energy 
cost assistance, while the other 16 percent is given to electricity and natural gas local distribution 
companies to pass on to their residential customers. Of the 44 percent given to businesses, 29 percent 
is allocated to the same local distribution companies to pass on to their commercial and industrial 
customers, and it is then passed on to households in proportion to their holdings of equities. The 
remaining 15 percent given to businesses is directed to energy-intensive, trade-exposed industries 
and passed on to consumers in the form of price decreases to offset the price increases in these 
industries induced by the cap-and-trade policy (CBO 2009b). 
EPA (2009) also estimates the cost of H.R.2454 to households. Rather than purchasing 
power, however, they estimate the average loss of consumption under the policy. Using their 
ADAGE computable general equilibrium model, they find an average household will incur a cost of 
$105 in 2020 (2005$).9 This cost is equivalent to 0.11 percent of total household consumption in 
2020. This analysis corresponds to the ADAGE model’s allowance price in 2020 of $16 per metric 
ton CO2. EPA does not look at the distribution of costs across different income groups.  
The EPA analysis allocates allowances in similar proportions to CBO, but the way in which 
they are distributed is different, because of their use of the ADAGE computable general equilibrium 
model. Allowances given to local distribution companies and trade-exposed industries, as well as 
many other recipients, are allocated within the general equilibrium model, so their distributional 
effects are subject to the equilibrium found within the model. For example, allowances allocated to 
electricity LDCs result in lower electricity prices for consumers, as opposed to a transfer to 
households as in the CBO analysis. Overall, 77.5 percent of the allowances are allocated in this way. 
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The remaining 22.5 percent of allowance value, however, is allocated outside of the ADAGE model, 
and this value is given directly to households as a lump-sum transfer on a per-capita basis. These 
allocations to households incorporate allowance value given to programs such as low-income energy 
cost assistance and merchant coal generators.  
EIA (2009) estimates the cost of H.R. 2454 as the average loss of consumption per 
household. Based on the results of their National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) energy–
economy model, the cost of the policy will be $134 (2007 $) for an average household in 2020. Like 
EPA, the EIA also does not calculate how this cost would be distributed among households of 
different income levels. The cost estimate corresponds to the NEMS allowance price in 2020 of $32 
per metric ton CO2. The EIA also allocates allowances in the proportions specified by H.R. 2454, 
such as those given to LDCs and trade-exposed industries. They do not specify how this allowance 
value is then passed on to households and shareholders, either within the NEMS model or outside of 
the modeling framework. 
Academic and governmental analyses provide various measures of the household burden of 
climate policy using different data and types of models and slightly different welfare measures. Each 
study has its strengths and weaknesses, but together they add to the continually growing body of 
literature on the incidence of climate policy. Our analysis seeks to further the literature by analyzing 
detailed and specific allowance allocation mechanisms such as exist in proposed legislation. Unlike 
other studies, we provide a range of estimates that are intended to capture the uncertainty associated 
with these complex allocation schemes. The simple cap-and-dividend approach is provided as a point 
of comparison.    
Data and Methodology 
We base our analysis on CES data from 2004 through 2008. The population sampled in the 
CES includes 133,421 observations for 51,694 households; an observation equals one household in 
one quarter. We use these observations to construct national after-tax income quintiles. Our sample 
for examining regional effects includes 112,306 observations for 42,828 households in 43 states plus 
the District of Columbia.10 We aggregate the observations into 11 regions. Although we do not use 
observations with missing state identifiers in our regional-level calculations, we do include them in 
our calculations at the national level. 
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We account for direct energy expenditures and indirect expenditures through the purchase of 
goods and services. 11  We focus the analysis on 2016, assuming that the distribution of consumption 
across regions and income groups would be the same as in our data period (2004-2008) in the 
absence of climate policy. The consumption data is combined with the average carbon contents of 
goods from Hassett et al. (2009) to estimate the CO2 content of every household’s consumption 
bundle. The average CO2 content of household goods is scaled to reflect changes in production and 
consumption that are predicted by EIA baseline forecast for 2016 outside the electricity sector and 
the forecast of RFF’s Haiku electricity market model in the electricity sector. This procedure ensures 
that our baseline emissions estimates for 2016 match those of EIA and the Haiku model.  
We use Haiku to model the electricity sector more accurately. The model solves for 
electricity market equilibria in 21 regions of the country that are mapped into the 11 regions we use 
for the distributional analysis. The electricity model accounts for price-sensitive demand, electricity 
transmission between regions, system operation for three seasons of the year (spring and fall are 
combined) and four times of day, and changes in demand and supply-side investment and retirement 
over a 25-year horizon (Paul et al. 2009). The Haiku model also captures differences in the 
regulatory environment across regions and allows us to model different behavioral assumptions 
corresponding to fixed and variable charges for residential, commercial, and industrial customers, as 
we explained in the introduction. Table 1 illustrates the electricity sector results for the 11 regions of 
the country that we model, with an indication of how we aggregate states into these regions.12 The 
model calculates a national baseline emissions rate of 0.602 tons of CO2 per megawatt-hour (MWh) 
for 2016 in the absence of any climate policy. In this example, the introduction of an emissions cap 
(and scenario characteristics that correspond to the “pessimistic case” described below) lead to an 
emissions allowance price of $20.86/metric ton CO2 (mtCO2) (2006 dollars). Emissions fall to 0.516 
tons/MWh. Table 1 also reports the percentage change in electricity price on a regional basis and the 
percentage change in consumption that is expected to result from the introduction of the price on CO2 
emissions. 
   
                                                   
11 Indirect consumption accounts for approximately 49 percent of an average household’s carbon emissions. 
12 The 48 contiguous states and the District of Columbia are included in the electricity modeling, but as noted, five states 
(Iowa, New Mexico, North Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming) are dropped when calculating effects on households at the 
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Ohio Valley IL, IN, KY, MI, MO, 
OH, WV, WI
0.782 0.660 7% -3%
Mid-Atlantic DE, MD, NJ, PA 0.573 0.500 8% -1%
Northeast CT, ME, MA, NH, RI 0.371 0.336 6% -2%
Northwest ID, MT, OR, UT, WA 0.406 0.234 1% 0%
New York NY 0.318 0.293 8% -1%
Plains KS, MN, NE, OK, SD 0.844 0.809 9% -4%
Mountains AZ, CO, NV 0.628 0.609 4% -2%
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Figure 1 illustrates the mechanism of placing a price on CO2 emissions through the 
introduction of a cap-and-trade policy. The horizontal axis in the graph represents the reduction in 
emissions (moving to the right implies lower emissions), and the upward-sloping curve is the 
incremental resource cost of a schedule of measures to reduce emissions; thus, it sketches out the 
marginal abatement cost (MAC) curve. The electricity sector MAC is generated from the Haiku 
model, whereas abatement behavior for the rest of the economy, excluding the electricity sector, is 
taken from the Energy Information Administration (2009) analysis of Waxman–Markey (H.R. 2454). 
The EIA MAC curve is combined with the Haiku electricity MAC curve to model economy-wide 
abatement behavior. Using this economy-wide curve, an endogenous allowance price (represented by Resources for the Future  Blonz, Burtraw, and Walls 
12 
the height of the rectangle) is calculated such that emissions in our incidence model match capped 
2016 EIA levels (17 mtCO2 equivalent).13  
 
Figure 1. Resource Cost and Allowance Value 
The triangular area under the marginal cost curve up to the emissions target is the cost of 
resources used to achieve emission reductions. The rectangle represents the value of emissions 
allowances generated (number of allowances times price per allowance) by the trading program. 
EIA’s analysis of H.R. 2454 provides an estimate of the aggregate burden, i.e., these two areas 
shown on the graph, along with a breakdown of this burden among sectors. We treat the electricity 
sector separately, using the Haiku model to obtain changes in emissions due to the CO2 price. All 
other sectors’ reductions and costs are assumed to match EIA. 
To calculate the distribution of losses across regions and households, we use baseline 
emissions intensities and own-price elasticities along with consumption expenditure and price 
increases. These data provide a first-order indication of the relative change in burden across 
various consumption categories resulting from the introduction of a price on CO2. This 
distribution of losses is then scaled proportionately across categories of consumption to match 
                                                   
13 http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/hr2454/excel/hr2454cap.xls Resources for the Future  Blonz, Burtraw, and Walls 
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the changes predicted by EIA and Haiku to generate an initial household burden. This explicitly 
assumes the initial change in household welfare in our model equals the sum of the resource cost 
and the allowance value estimated by EIA and Haiku. This approach rests on the implicit 
assumption that producers pass all costs through to consumers and bear none of the costs 
themselves, which is approximately true in the short run, when demand is relatively inelastic. As 
a result, our estimate of the initial household burden outside the electricity sector for the average 
household matches EIA’s estimate of abatement cost (including allowance cost).14 
After initial household burdens are calculated, allowance value is distributed based on 
scenario dependent allocation schemes. This refunded allowance value is subtracted from the 
initial household burden to calculate a net household burden. 
As mentioned above, for electricity we use the Haiku electricity market model in place of 
EIA’s forecast for the sector. The Haiku model reports price changes that are somewhat different 
across regions and slightly lower on average than EIA. Using Haiku in place of the EIA electricity 
model preserves substantial detail with respect to regions and customer classes and allows for the 
various treatments of customer classes and allocation scenarios that we discuss below.  
We use the cost estimate that is predicted by EIA outside the electricity sector and by Haiku 
within the electricity sector to estimate the total burden on households to achieve an emissions 
reduction target for 2016. EIA’s 2016 emissions level provides our emissions target, and we hold it 
constant across scenarios.15 Across regions and income groups, these effects are distributed according 
to the expenditure patterns revealed in the Haiku model and the CES data. 
Description of H.R. 2454 Cap-and-Trade Program  
Title III of H.R. 2454 sets an annual cap on greenhouse gas emissions covering 
approximately 85 percent of all emissions in the U.S. including, among many others, those from oil 
refineries, natural gas suppliers, electricity generators, and industries such as cement, paper, iron, 
                                                   
14 This exercise does not affect our distributional findings. It does, however, provide estimates of the overall level of 
houehold burden. 
15 Both the EIA and Haiku models solve for aggregate intertemporal emissions targets and an intertemporal equilibrium 
that include potential changes in banking and the purchase of offsets. The models vary to a small degree with respect to 
emissions obtained in 2016. To hold constant the emissions in that year, we scale the results across scenarios. This 
introduces a small inconsistency in the aggregate intertemporal emissions reductions achieved over the modeling horizon, 
but that does not affect the distributional issues that are our focus in this paper.  Resources for the Future  Blonz, Burtraw, and Walls 
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steel, and chemicals. The cap becomes gradually more stringent over time. In 2012, the first year the 
law would go into effect, covered emissions are required to be 3 percent below 2005 levels; by 2020, 
2030, and 2050, this figure rises to 17, 42, and 83 percent, respectively. The cap is met by allocating 
emissions allowances among the regulated entities; those allowances can then be traded. The bill has 
approximately 22 separate provisions dealing with allowance allocation. Table 2 shows the 
breakdown for 2016, the year of our analysis. 
We have divided the provisions into categories. A significant percentage of total emissions 
allowances is to go toward relieving the burden of higher energy prices on households. Thus, both 
electricity and natural gas LDCs receive allowances. For electricity LDCs, which receive 30 percent 
of total allowances, distribution is based one-half on emissions and one-half on electricity output. 
Natural gas LDCs receive 9 percent of allowances. LDCs are regulated or publicly owned entities in 
all 50 states, so they can be expected to act as trustees on behalf of consumers, passing the value of 
allowances on to customers through lower rates (or equivalently funding investments) rather than 
retaining it as profits. How exactly they will do this is the subject of much debate and we return to 
this issue below. Other allocations are designed for a variety of purposes – to reduce the burden on 
low-income households, to provide money for adaptation to climate change, to fund supplemental 
international reductions, to lessen the burden on industries that are thought to be particularly hard hit 
by climate policy, and to enhance energy efficiency, technology development, and the development 
of renewable energy. 
Many of the allocations will be handled by federal and state government to further climate 
related goals. These allocations, however, do not address the impact of a carbon price on 
government. Federal, state, and local government account for approximately 14 percent of all CO2 
emissions in the U.S. (CBO 2009b), yet H.R. 2454 does not explicitly set aside allowances to cover 
those emissions.16 We return to this issue and explain how we handle it in the next section of the 
paper.  
                                                   
16 Bills introduced in the U.S. Senate that have an impact on the federal budget are required to specify how that impact 
will be addressed, thus S. 1733 and 2877 both explicitly provide for increased government costs, though they do so 
imprecisely and do not account for changes in state and local costs. No such requirement exists in the House.  Resources for the Future  Blonz, Burtraw, and Walls 
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Section of Bill 





782(a)(1)  783(b)  LDCs - Electricity  30.00  Allocated  through  fixed 
charge on electricity bills 
Allocated through variable 
charge on electricity bills 
782(b)  784  LDCs - Natural gas  9.00  Captured in MAC curve 
782(c)  785  Home heating oil, propane  1.50 
Low Income   782(d)  Title IV (C)  Energy refunds for low-income consumers  15.00  Per-capita dividend to low income households 
Industry 782(a)(1)  783(c)(d)  Merchant  coal,  long-term contracts  5.01  Shareholders 
782(e)  765  Trade-vulnerable, energy-intensive industries  14.44  Captured in MAC curve 
782(j) 787  Refineries  2.25  Shareholders 
Adaptation & 
Adjustment 
782(k)  Title IV (B2)  Climate Change Worker Adj. Assistance Fund  0.50   
 
 
Per-capita dividend to all households 
 
782(l)  453, 467  Domestic adaptation, including Climate Change 
Health Protection and Promotion Fund 
1.00 
782(m)  480(a)(b)  Wildlife and natural resources - to states and 
natural resource climate change adaptation fund 
1.00 
782(u) 788(b)  Supplemental  agriculture  0.14 
International  782(n)  Title IV (E2) International  adaptation  1.00   
Lost revenue overseas  782(o)  Title IV (D)  International clean technology development  1.00 







782(i)  124  Investment in clean vehicle technology 3.00  Abatement  at  $75/ton
* Revenue  lost 
782(f)  786  Development of CCS Technology 1.75  Abatement  at  $50/ton
* Revenue  lost 
782(u) 788(c)  Supplemental  Renewable  Energy 0.14  Abatement  at  $34/ton
* Revenue  lost 
782(g)(1)  132  Investment in energy efficiency and renewable 
energy 
3.25 Abatement  at  $34/ton
* Revenue  lost 
3.25 
Electricity consumption 
reduced at 2.8 cents/kwh
* 
Revenue lost 
782(a)(2) 783(e)  Efficiency,  ratepayer assistance, etc through 
small electricity LDCs 
0.50 Revenue  lost 
782(g)(3)  132  State renewables and energy efficiency programs  0.05  Revenue lost 
782(h)  171, 172  Energy innovation hubs, advanced energy 
research 
1.50 Revenue  lost 
782(g)(2)  201  Efficiency in building codes  0.50  Captured in MAC curve  Revenue lost 
TOTAL       100.78     
Cap in 2016      5,482 MMT CO2e 
    
*Affects households through lower allowance price or through lower electricity bills. Resources for the Future  Blonz, Burtraw, and Walls 
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How money will be spent is unclear in many cases. For example, money flows into several 
funds, such as the Natural Resource Climate Change Adaptation Fund, but no guidance is provided 
on how those funds are to be spent. The same problem exists for many of the energy efficiency, 
renewables, and technology development programs. Much of the money is allocated to state 
administered programs, but with no strict requirements as to how the funds are spent.  
Even in those provisions that contain more specifics, outcomes and impacts on households 
are still highly uncertain. The LDC provisions are a case in point. Because they are regulated, LDCs 
are required to pass on the allowance value to consumers, but it is not obvious exactly how they will 
do that. H.R. 2454 has language suggesting that LDCs reduce fixed charges on monthly electricity 
bills for residential and commercial class customers “to the maximum extent feasible,” but such a 
change is thought to be infeasible in practice and the more likely outcome is a reduction in variable 
electricity rates (Burtraw 2009). The outcome has serious implications for the cost of the policy. If 
variable rates are reduced, electricity consumption remains higher than it would be if the price of 
electricity reflected the price of CO2 allowances used in generation. Consequently, other sectors of 
the economy must work harder to reduce emissions in order to meet the economy-wide cap. This 
increases the allowance price and the overall cost of the program (Burtraw, Walls, and Blonz 2009). 
How households are affected, on net, is unclear, but we expect on average that households are made 
worse off for the effort to subsidize their electricity consumption. On the one hand, electricity prices 
are lower as are electricity expenditures. On the other hand, a higher allowance price results in 
increased prices for expenditures on goods and services other than electricity. Because the overall 
value of allowances is greater, how these allowances flow into various categories will also affect the 
outcome.  
The energy efficiency, renewables, and technology development provisions also generate 
highly uncertain outcomes. Some observers and efficiency advocates have argued that a great deal of 
“low-hanging fruit” is available for reducing energy use and CO2 emissions. In fact, an iconic image 
of the last decade, in energy policy circles, is the McKinsey efficiency curve that indicates substantial 
opportunities to reduce energy use at no cost or significant negative cost (McKinsey and Company 
2007). That study and several replicas, for example Sweeney and Weyant (2008), identify marginal 
abatement cost curves for reducing CO2 emissions. These curves show engineering cost estimates for 
achieving the same or a comparable level of energy services through a variety of energy-saving 
options in production and consumption. From an economic perspective, the technical costs of energy-
saving options only address half the problem. There may be significant behavioral, informational or 
social barriers to realizing these potential technical gains. In any case, the ultimate impact of these 
provisions on energy use, emissions, and household welfare are unclear; allocating money to energy Resources for the Future  Blonz, Burtraw, and Walls 
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efficiency programs, technology development, renewable energy, and the like may improve upon 
private market outcomes or it might simply lead to wasted expenditures. 
Modeling Strategy 
To illustrate the range of potential impacts on the overall costs of the policy and the 
distribution of those costs across households, we model two bookend scenarios with respect to the 
LDC and energy efficiency provisions of the Waxman–Markey bill. One scenario is optimistic and 
the other pessimistic, distinguished by the possibility that uncertain provisions of the bill lead to 
efficiency-enhancing outcomes or not.  
With respect to the LDC allocations, in the pessimistic scenario, we assume the allowance 
value flows to all classes of customers—residential, commercial, and industrial—via a reduction in 
the variable electricity rates on monthly bills. As we explained above, consumption is higher as a 
consequence of the subsidy to electricity prices, so the allowance price is higher in this case and the 
overall costs of the policy are higher as a result; this is the sense in which the assumption is 
pessimistic. In the optimistic scenario, we assume that fixed charges are reduced for industrial and 
commercial customers. However, we assume this remains infeasible for residential customers. As 
explained in Burtraw, Walls, and Blonz (2009), a review of current billing practices and state public 
utility commission behavior suggests that significant hurdles exist to implementing this kind of 
pricing (a reduction in the fixed portion of the electricity bill) by 2016. One prominent reason for this 
is that in almost no case does the fixed portion of costs appear as a separate line item on bills for 
residential class customers, and even when it does appear separately, the cost is recovered almost 
entirely through volumetric charges. Furthermore, even if it were possible to return allowance value 
to residential customers through fixed payments it is unclear how residential customers would 
respond. Many observers have suggested that residential customers are unlikely to understand and 
respond in an economically rational way to an increase in the variable rate (marginal cost) by 
reducing consumption if their overall bill were reduced.17 Industrial and commercial electricity 
consumers, however, may have a more sophisticated understanding of the difference between the 
fixed and variable parts of their bill, and thus we evaluate this possibility in our optimistic case with 
respect to the allocation to LDCs. 
                                                   
17 Borenstein (2009) illustrates that models of consumer response that have been used in many previous studies of 
increasing-block pricing are not realistic models of the information consumers have at the time they make consumption 
decisions. Resources for the Future  Blonz, Burtraw, and Walls 
18 
Another of the significant sources of uncertainty affecting the future development of energy 
and climate policy is the ability to harvest potential low cost opportunities for improvements in the 
way producers and consumers use energy. Indeed, how well previous investments of this nature have 
performed remains controversial (Arimura, Newell, and Palmer 2009). The Waxman–Markey bill 
would expand the previous programs to a national scale, and how well this approach would perform 
in the future in regions that have no experience with such programs is even more uncertain. These so-
called “opportunity regions” may have substantial undeveloped potential, but they also lack the 
infrastructure, expertise and regulatory rules such as decoupling of cost recovery from energy sales 
that have developed over many years in other regions. In addition, these regions historically have 
lacked the will (perhaps because of historically low prices) to implement such programs. On the 
other hand, intuition and some evidence indicate that the greatest efficiency improvements at the 
least cost may be technically possible in these regions. Arimura, Newell, and Palmer (2009) 
speculate that incremental spending by utilities that had low previous levels of spending could 
achieve savings at one-half the incremental cost of previous programs. 
In the case of allowance value directed to energy efficiency and technology development, our 
optimistic scenario uses selective estimates in the literature for the cost of reducing electricity 
consumption through end-use efficiency improvements. We based the optimistic scenario on the 
premise that these options would not be adopted in response to the price signal introduced from the 
cap-and-trade program alone. The advocates of spending resources through LDCs on energy 
efficiency programs argue that this spending can overcome institutional or market barriers and, in 
effect, accomplish cost-effective investments (of the type illustrated by McKinsey 2007) that 
households cannot or do not make for themselves (Cowart 2008). Hence, in the optimistic scenario, 
spending by government or LDCs on energy efficiency provides a net benefit to society.  
In a large survey of the energy efficiency literature, Gillingham, Newell, and Palmer (2004) 
estimate that investments in efficiency have reduced electricity use at a payoff of about 2.8 cents per 
kWh of electricity saved (2002$). However, subsequent studies characterize this as a very optimistic 
estimate. Using improved statistical methods, Arimura, Newell, and Palmer (2009) estimate an 
average cost of 6.2 cents per kWh (2007$) saved in previous programs. Accounting for the 
possibility of improvement in program design and the expansion to new regions of the country that 
provide low-cost opportunities, we use the Gillingham, Newell, and Palmer estimate of 2.8 cents per 
kWh as an optimistic forecast of the cost-effectiveness of future investments in efficiency on average 
across the nation. We apply an average emissions intensity of electricity generation in the country of 
0.000523 tons CO2 per kWh of generation as forecast by the Haiku model in the baseline to arrive at Resources for the Future  Blonz, Burtraw, and Walls 
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an optimistic estimate of $53.50 as the cost per ton of avoided emissions resulting from energy 
efficiency investments.18   
Compared to other estimates of the cost of emissions reductions and our estimated allowance 
prices, the cost per ton for reductions that could be achieved through energy efficiency are relatively 
expensive. However, these investments not only reduce emissions but they also reduce spending on 
electricity, providing a direct savings and, thus, an additional benefit to households. We also capture 
this impact in the model. 
The optimistic estimates for the technology development provisions—those provisions 
targeting renewable energy, clean vehicles, and carbon capture and storage (CCS)—come from 
McKinsey and Company (2007), Kammen et al. (2009), and Al-Juaied and Whitmore (2009). These 
studies provide estimates of the cost per ton of CO2 emissions reduced when particular technologies 
or alternative fuels are used in place of the conventional option. Al-Juaied and Whitmore (2009), for 
example, estimate the cost of abating CO2 emissions through CCS, both for a first-of-a-kind plant 
and a mature technology plant in 2030, using a range of cost estimates from several previous studies. 
They conclude a first-of-a-kind plant is likely to have an abatement cost of $100–150 per metric ton 
CO2 avoided, while a mature technology plant is likely to have an abatement cost of $30–50 per 
metric ton CO2 avoided. Kammen et al. (2009) estimate the cost per ton of emissions reduced in a 
range of scenarios for plug-in hybrid and electric vehicles compared with conventional gasoline 
vehicles. As mentioned above, McKinsey and Company (2007) has cost and effectiveness estimates 
for a range of technologies and scenarios.  
Based on findings in these studies, we assume in the optimistic case that CCS, renewable 
energy, and clean vehicle technology provide CO2 emissions reductions at costs of $50/ton, $34/ton, 
and $75/ton, respectively.19 In the pessimistic scenario, we assume that these activities and 
investments have no benefit and thus all of the allowance value devoted to them is lost.  
Using these estimates along with the percentages devoted to these activities as specified in 
the bill, we calculate the total amount of money available, and then compute total emissions 
reductions. This means that fewer reductions are needed elsewhere in the economy, thus lowering the 
                                                   
18 For comparison, EIA (2009b) indicates average emissions intensity in 2010 is 0.000558 tons CO2 per kWh. 
19 We do not solve with any specific introduction date for any of the technology development provisions, and they may 
not be deployed by 2016. Instead, we assumed that some of these technologies will work to reduce cumulative emissions 
targets over the lifetime of the cap-and-trade policy, and consequently 2016 allowance prices, through the banking 
mechanism. Resources for the Future  Blonz, Burtraw, and Walls 
20 
allowance price and providing a benefit to households. The pessimistic scenario simply assumes that 
the money going to all of the efficiency and technology provisions is lost. 
Table 2 summarizes the assumptions that we use in our two scenarios for the Waxman–
Markey bill. About 57 percent of allowances are allocated in the same way across the two scenarios; 
these are shown in the bottom portion of the table. The first four rows of that section show 
allocations that are captured in EIA’s marginal abatement cost curve and that are taken into account 
in both the optimistic and pessimistic representation of H.R. 2454.20 The provision dealing with low-
income consumers is for households with annual incomes less than 150 percent of the poverty line. 
The EIA is directed to estimate loss in purchasing power for this group, and to refund it via direct 
cash transfers. We assume the allocations to refineries and to merchant (independently owned, 
unregulated) coal generation plants do not affect the variable costs of production, and hence are 
earned as industry profits that flow back to shareholders. Assigning the value of the domestic 
adaptation provisions to households is difficult. This money goes to dedicated trust funds; the money 
from those funds is to be spent on programs that offset the impacts of climate change. For lack of a 
better alternative, we simply distribute this money back to households as a lump-sum payment per 
person. Finally, we assume that all of the value of allowances going to international efforts — 
adaptation, forestry, and clean technology development — is lost to the U.S. economy.  
The remaining allowances, or 43 percent of the total, are examined under the alternative 
optimistic and pessimistic scenarios. These allowances go to electricity LDCs and the variety of 
energy efficiency and technology development provisions discussed above.  
We emphasize that the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios, particularly in the case of the 
energy efficiency and technology provisions, are truly bookends, i.e., they reflect the range of 
plausible outcomes and the truth may lie somewhere in between. Nonetheless, they provide a sense 
of the uncertainty in the outcomes with such a large and complex climate bill.  
 For a third and final comparison, we model the impacts of a cap-and-trade program with 100 
percent auction of allowances, with 75 percent of the revenue returned as a lump-sum per capita 
payment, i.e., a cap-and-dividend program. This formulation roughly corresponds to the Cantwell–
Collins proposal (S. 2877), which reserves 25 percent of allowance value for a set of unspecified 
                                                   
20 This includes 3.75 percent of allocation directed to LDCs and home heating that EIA models explicitly as investments 
in energy efficiency. This is incorporated in the EIA marginal cost curves, and is held constant across our scenarios. 
Allocation to natural gas LDCs and home heating also is captured in the EIA model and is constant across our scenarios. Resources for the Future  Blonz, Burtraw, and Walls 
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spending priorities. To model this, we assume that the funds that are not returned as dividends 
include money directed to lowering consumer costs for home heating from natural gas and fuel oil 
(6.75 percent) and expenditures on related energy efficiency programs and building codes (4.25 
percent). In addition, we assume the maintenance of allowance cost rebates to energy-intensive, 
trade-exposed industries (14.44 percent). These priorities are embodied in the marginal cost curves 
we adopt from the EIA.  
Finally, across all three scenarios we maintain the assumption that government incurs 
additional costs for its own direct expenditures on energy and other goods and services that are equal 
to 14 percent of allowance value.21 It is not known if governments would meet these costs through 
tax increases or spending decreases, so the incidence of the costs is uncertain. Previous studies have 
frequently omitted this change in government cost, thereby implicitly introducing a tax that is hidden 
from their analyses, which will be paid ultimately by households. CBO (2009b) does not account for 
this cost directly, but nets it out against the 18 percent of allowances to government for spending on 
projects such as renewable energy and energy efficiency, and thus does not distribute to households 
these increases in government costs and spending. EPA (2009) predicts that increased prices of goods 
and services will increase government spending and assumes the increase is made up by adjusting 
taxes in a lump-sum manner. EIA (2009) analysis of H.R. 2454 does not specify if government costs 
increase under the policy, or if so, how the NEMS model accounts for the increased costs. 
To account for the effect this has on household well being, we assume an increase in 
government costs equal to 14 percent of allowance value. Although the share is constant across 
scenarios, the absolute value of government’s change in costs differs with the allowance price. We 
assume budget neutrality in this regard, as does EPA, but we assume this is achieved through an 
increase in the average personal income tax for each income group. The increase in personal income 
taxes is accounted for in calculating the net burden per household. 
Results       
Table 3 shows the average net household burden by income quintile and for all households 
for the three scenarios: the two H.R. 2454 scenarios and the 75 percent cap-and-dividend scenario. 
We first discuss the national average household burden and compare the different scenarios; in the 
following section, we explain the distributional results. 
                                                   
21 CBO (2009a) predicts this cost to be 14 percent of allowance value; CBO (2009b) predicts it to be 13 percent. Resources for the Future  Blonz, Burtraw, and Walls 
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Table 3. Average Net Household Burden of Three Cap-and-Trade Scenarios, by Income 
Quintile (in 2006$) 
 
Impacts on Average Households 
The average net household burden varies widely across the three scenarios, from 
$133/household in the optimistic H.R. 2454 scenario to $418/household in the pessimistic scenario, 
with the cap-and-dividend option in between, at $206/household. There are a number of factors 
driving the differences. We focus first on the comparison of our optimistic and pessimistic scenarios. 
Three categories of assumptions distinguish the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios: the 
assumptions about how LDCs will pass on the value of allowances to customers, in fixed or variable 
charges, and the assumptions about whether the value of allowances devoted to energy efficiency and 
technology programs yield benefits or are simply wasted resources. Separating the effects of these 
three policies on the difference between the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios is not 
straightforward. Each policy affects the allowance price, which in turn has a direct effect on 
household expenditures and on the revenue that flows to the other program areas. For example, a 
change in the LDC allocation from optimistic to pessimistic scenario causes the allowance price to 
increase, making more allowance revenue available as compensation for low-income families and for 
both technology and energy efficiency programs.  
To understand the effects of these three policies we use the Shapley value, which is an 
axiomatic approach to sharing of costs or benefits (Roth 1988). The Shapley value is based on the 
calculation of the marginal contribution of every possible combination of policies that distinguish the 
optimistic and pessimistic scenarios, resulting in a unique estimate of the share of that difference that 










1 11,276 ‐110 ‐122 ‐65
2 26,804 21 111 7
3 44,060 181 408 106
4 68,609 314 667 255
5 140,283 258 1,029 725
All 58,207 133 418 206
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along with the Shapley values that describe the percent of the reduction in cost and allowance price 
that can be attributed to each of the policies. 
Table 4. Shapley Values by Income Quintile per Household for LDC, Technology Provisions 
and Electricity Energy Efficiency Programs 
 
The changes in the average cost and allowance value due to the LDC billing behavior are 
minimal. This is because the difference between the pessimistic and optimistic LDC assumptions is 
not as extreme as it is for the other two policies. Changing from pessimistic to optimistic assumptions 
for LDCs is a reallocation from one method of spending the revenue to a more efficient one. For the 
other two programs, the switch from pessimistic to optimistic constitutes a shift from an 
unproductive loss of the revenue to productive investments that benefit households. Although the 
pessimistic LDC assumptions do have real costs and efficiency losses for households, on average 
they only account for 6 percent of the loss in household burden.  
The savings to households due to changes in LDC assumptions are dwarfed by those of the 
electricity energy efficiency program, which accounts for 69 percent of the cost savings.22 Efficiency 
policies provide savings through two separate mechanisms. Because of improved efficiency, 
households purchase less electricity than they would otherwise, and the lower quantity of 
consumption leads to a lower equilibrium price in electricity markets that further benefits 
                                                   
22 This percentage does not include efficiency measures totaling 4.25 percent that are included in the EIA marginal 
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households. In addition, emissions decline because less electricity is generated, meaning that other 
sectors of the economy do not need to reduce emissions as much; this lowers the allowance price and 
reduces overall costs. The efficiency investments account for cost savings of $99 due to avoided 
electricity expenditures for the average household compared to the pessimistic cases where no such 
investments exist.23 This effect, in combination with the 28 percent allowance price reduction caused 
by the program, yields the full $197 (69 percent) savings due to the optimistic assumptions. 
Although the payoff from electricity efficiency initiatives can be, and often is, sharply 
debated, we feel that the technology development initiatives in H.R. 2454 may be even more 
speculative. Over 8 percent of allowances are directed to CCS, clean vehicle technology, and 
renewable energy, and in our optimistic scenario, we assume these three investments provide CO2 
abatement at $50, $75 and $34 per ton respectively. These costs are greater than the value attained 
for emissions reductions in other components of the model, so they raise program costs at least in the 
near term (2016). Nonetheless, in the optimistic scenario they provide a total reduction in emissions 
of 127 million tons. This lessens the burden on other sectors and lowers the allowance price 
compared to the pessimistic scenario. We hasten to point out that because of their relatively high 
abatement costs, these initiatives do not lower the allowance price in comparison with an alternative 
where the money would be returned to households directly or spent on more cost-effective CO2 
reduction options.  
Even considering the high abatement costs of the technology programs, they account for 51 
percent, or $5.22, of the reduction in the allowance price between the pessimistic and optimistic 
cases. This large decrease is responsible for 25 percent of the savings ($71 per household). While 
these savings are significant, it is important to note that they are much smaller than those of the 
electricity energy efficiency program, although technology programs receive 8.1 percent of 
allowance value, compared to only 5.3 percent dedicated to the efficiency program.  
As shown in Table 2, all of the revenue directed at energy efficiency and abatement programs 
is assumed to be lost in the pessimistic scenario. This money constitutes 13.44 percent of allowance 
value, approximately $17.4 billion ($134/household) of revenue, which does not find its way back to 
households. Households would experience a decreased burden of $286 if this money were rebated 
                                                   
23 The government benefits from the electricity energy efficiency programs in the same way that households realize 
savings from decreased utility bills. The energy efficiency programs reduce the revenue collected by the government to 
pay for their increased energy costs under cap-and-trade. The electricity energy efficiency programs save households 
$16/year in increased tax revenue in the optimistic case. Resources for the Future  Blonz, Burtraw, and Walls 
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directly, and they experience even greater savings as it is spent on energy efficiency and direct 
abatement programs. The cap-and-dividend case does not share the complexities of the H.R. 2454 
scenarios and is hence much easier to understand. There is no uncertainty as to the potential 
effectiveness of energy efficiency and technology development programs or the outcomes of 
electricity LDC allocations.24 Instead, 75 percent of auction revenue is directed as a per capita 
dividend back to households that, as a result, experience a modest burden of $206 per year (last 
column of Table 3). The allowance price in this scenario is $17.37—substantially lower than in the 
pessimistic H.R. 2454 case but higher than in the optimistic case.  
One reason the price and the net household burden are lower than in the pessimistic case is 
because of the 7 percent of allowance value going overseas to adaptation and supplemental reduction 
purposes in H.R. 2454 but not in the cap-and-dividend case. If this program were included in the cap-
and-dividend scenario, directing a comparable 7 percent share of allowance value overseas, it would 
raise the average cost per household from $206 to $257. Furthermore, in the cap-and-dividend case, 
there is no cost from LDC allocations; but even in our optimistic scenario, we assume that LDC 
allocation leads to lower electricity prices for residential households, which increases the cost of the 
policy. However, most importantly, the uncertainty is eliminated. The wide range in our optimistic 
and pessimistic scenarios costs is a result of the uncertainty in how the LDC allocation will be 
implemented, as well as how the energy efficiency and technology provisions will work in practice, 
an uncertainty that does not exist with cap-and-dividend.  
Distributional Consequences Across Income Groups  
In addition to differences for average households, our scenarios also reveal potential 
differences by income quintiles. However, the overall distributional consequence appears of 
secondary importance, compared to the overall changes in the level of the policy, which are reflected 
in the cost for the average household. The outcomes are reported in Table 3.  
The H.R. 2454 optimistic scenario exhibits comparatively low costs for most income 
quintiles compared to the other scenarios, which is driven by the low allowance price and electricity 
savings due to energy efficiency programs. In the optimistic H.R. 2454 scenario, we assume that 
                                                   
24 As in the optimistic and pessimistic Waxman–Markey cases, a small portion of allowance value directed to energy 
efficiency programs, as well as to subsidize home heating and to support trade-exposed industries is built into EIA 
modeling of the policy. Concequently,  the outcome from these measures does not vary across our scenarios. In the cap-
and-dividend case, this constitutes the 25.44 percent of allowance value that is not returned as dividends to households. Resources for the Future  Blonz, Burtraw, and Walls 
26 
LDCs are able to pass the allowance value through the fixed portion of electricity bills for 
commercial and industrial customers; in the pessimistic scenario, the value ends up reducing variable 
electricity prices. These differences have significant distributional consequences. In the optimistic 
case, the transfer ultimately finds its way to shareholders, the vast majority of which belong to the 
top income quintile. In the pessimistic case, commercial and industrial customers pass through the 
reduced electricity price to lower prices of goods and services; this benefits all consumers. 
Consumption is less concentrated in the upper income quintiles than is the share of share ownership, 
which explains the fact that the average household in the fourth quintile bears a higher burden than 
the average household in the top quintile, in the optimistic scenario.  
This effect can be seen in the Shapley values in Table 4. The fifth income quintile sees 
significant benefits from the optimistic LDC assumption due to transfers to shareholders. Forty 
percent of the reduction in high income household burdens moving from the pessimistic to optimistic 
case is due to the LDC assumption.  The bottom four income quintiles, however, actually see their 
burdens rise from the LDC assumptions.  They lose out because they do not receive the LDC subsidy 
through lower electricity and goods prices nor through an increase in shareholder value. Households 
in quintiles 1-4 gain relatively more from the energy efficiency assumptions.  While high-income 
households may receive more absolute savings from the energy efficiency provisions, savings to 
households in the lower quintiles are a larger share of their overall savings that result from the 
optimistic scenario.  
Households in the lowest income quintile have almost the same net burden in the optimistic 
and pessimistic cases.  This results from the fact that low-income households receive 15 percent of 
total allowance value in both cases. The lower allowance price in the optimistic case leads to a 
smaller amount of money going to these households and this offsets some of the gains from the 
optimistic assumptions.  
Figure 2 displays the net household burdens of the three scenarios as a percent of income. 
Both of the H.R. 2454 scenarios display a similarly shaped distribution in which costs increase as a 
percent of income for the 1
st through 4
th income quintile, but decline for the 5
th quintile. This is most 
striking in the optimistic case, where the 5
th quintile has a lower burden as a percentage of income 
than the 3
rd quintile. As discussed above, these results are mostly due to LDC allocations ultimately 
finding their way to shareholders.  By contrast, the cap-and-dividend scenario exhibits progressivity 
across the full income distribution. 
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Figure 2. Average Net Household Burden as a Percent of Income of Three Cap-and-Trade 
Scenarios, by Income Quintile 
 
The results suggest that the uncertainty in outcomes in the Waxman-Markey bill does not 
lead to sharp differences in the relative impacts on different income groups, just differences in the 
absolute impacts. For example, the second quintile’s burden as a percent of total burden across all 
quintiles is equal to 3 percent and 5 percent in the optimistic and pessimistic cases respectively; the 
fifth quintile’s burden is 39 and 49 percent of the total in each case.  These are small differences 
considering the absolute differences in burdens between the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios.  
The first income quintile is a slight exception, however. As explained above, it has roughly 
the same burden as a percent of income in either the optimistic and pessimistic case.  This is a result 
of our assumption about how the bill’s provisions for low-income consumers flow to households (15 
percent of total allowance value), which we hold constant across the optimistic and pessimistic 
scenarios.  
Economists have long understood that current consumption is often based more on lifetime or 
permanent income than on current income.  Some households with low current earnings, for 
example, might actually be consuming at a higher level due to their position in their career path 
(beginning or retirement) or other factors. For this reason, an analysis of the distributional impacts of Resources for the Future  Blonz, Burtraw, and Walls 
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a tax or other policy that groups households by annual income may misrepresent the true 
distributional impacts (Fullerton and Rogers 1993).  Other problems such as inaccuracy in the 
reporting of annual incomes in a survey could contribute to the problem.25 
 
Figure 3. Average Net Household Burden as a Percent of Consumption of Three Cap-and-
Trade Scenarios, by Consumption Quintile  
 
Unfortunately, in cross-section data such as the CES, a measure of lifetime income is 
unavailable.  As in other cross-section studies, however, we can use current consumption as a proxy 
for lifetime income (Poterba 1989; Hassett, Marthur, and Metcalf 2009; Burtraw, Sweeney, and 
Walls 2009).   Figure 3 displays net household burdens as a percent of consumption for all three 
policy scenarios. The results are quite similar to those using annual income.  Minor differences 
include the cap-and-dividend scenario being slightly more progressive than when annual income is 
                                                   
25 It is important to note that starting in 2004 (our first year of data) the consumer expenditure survey started 
imputing annual income. This fills in nonresponess and improves the overall qualtiy of CES annual income data 
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used and the two Waxman-Markey scenarios looking progressive across the full distribution rather 
than just through the fourth quintile.   
Examining the carbon pricing component alone, ignoring the distribution of allowance 
value, shows the policy to be regressive on the basis of annual income but approximately 
proportional on the basis of consumption.  This is a typical finding in studies of energy taxes, 
general sales taxes, and other consumption-based taxes.26  But with the complex distribution of 
allowance value to households, these differences in results across the two different income 
measures are muted and results for the two metrics are roughly comparable. It is important to 
note also that a large share of the rebate programs in Waxman-Markey (and as represented in this 
analysis) are means tested based on annual income. Allocation to shareholders is also based on 
annual income, not consumption. These factors help explain why the income and consumption 
measures of burden are similar, despite differences in the effects of carbon pricing before 
accounting for allowance value.   
Conclusion 
Climate change poses an extraordinarily challenging coordination problem for the 
international community and for the domestic body politic. This difficulty is exacerbated because the 
science of climate change, the underlying characterization of opportunities to reduce emissions, and 
the prospects for technological change are all extremely uncertain. Although the uncertainty about 
effects and outcomes may be seen by the scientific community as the motivation for the 
implementation of policy to reduce emissions, the same sources of uncertainty have emerged among 
critics as fundamental reasons to object to climate policy in political debate.  
This paper focuses not on scientific or economic uncertainty, and only partially on 
technological uncertainty. Instead, we focus on a new source of uncertainty that is introduced in the 
design and implementation of policy intended to address this challenge. Specifically, we focus 
narrowly on uncertainty about the level and distribution of the burden on households that result from 
the formula for the allocation of emissions allowances in recent bills in the U.S. Congress. Even with 
                                                   
26 The Poterba (1989) study showed this, as have several others since then.  Indeed, in our earlier study, we showed 
that the effects of carbon pricing alone were regressive on the basis of annual income but roughly proportional on 
the basis of annual consumption (Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls 2009).  However, the net effect, incorporating the 
distribution of allowance value (in various alternative schemes) looked quite similar across the two income 
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this narrow focus, we find uncertainty about the implementation of the program and its costs on 
households to be substantial. The finding that policy design may exacerbate the fundamental 
characteristic that makes climate policy such a daunting challenge in the first place may be important 
to making progress on the policy debate.  
We examine the allocation under H.R. 2454 (the Waxman-Markey bill) under bookend 
scenarios that we label optimistic and pessimistic. In the scenarios, we explore the possible outcome 
with respect to three sets of issues. The first two scenarios explore the effect of allocations to 
electricity LDCs (30 percent of allowances) and the effect of allocations to promote efficiency (5.3 
percent) and energy technology (8.14 percent). The remaining allowance allocations are held 
constant across the scenarios. In the optimistic scenario, we assume that the allocation to LDCs 
introduces relatively minimal distortions away from efficient pricing of electricity, although 
distortions remain important for the residential class of customers, and we assume favorable 
outcomes with respect to expenditures on efficiency and technology development. The pessimistic 
scenario has contrary assumptions; in fact, in the pessimistic case, we assume that efficiency and 
technology investments are wasted. For comparison, we consider a third scenario that directs 75 
percent of allowance value directly back to households, keeping the remaining 25 percent directed to 
some of the categories that are held constant in the other two scenarios; this “cap-and-dividend” 
scenario is similar to the Cantwell-Collins bill (S. 2877). 
Although the assumptions underlying our optimistic and pessimistic scenarios are bookends, 
they highlight the wide range of potential outcomes under a complex allocation scheme such as 
espoused in current climate bills, and they represent assessments that are commonly found as part of 
the contemporary political debate. We find that if investments in electricity energy efficiency 
programs and technology development pay off, and if, for industrial and commercial class customers, 
allocations to electricity LDCs do not dampen the rise in electricity prices brought about by climate 
policy, then the average net household burden experienced by households is only $136 in 2016 and 
the allowance price is as low as $13.20/ton. On the other hand, if the energy efficiency and 
technology investments are wasted and LDC allocations do dampen price rises for all electricity 
customers, the net household burden rises to $420, with an allowance price of $23.43/ton.  
Shapley values help untangle the contribution of each policy in contributing to cost savings 
under the optimistic assumptions. The LDC assumption is only responsible for 7 percent of the 
savings, with a large part of the benefits accruing to the highest income quintile at the expense of the Resources for the Future  Blonz, Burtraw, and Walls 
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lower quintiles. The electricity energy efficiency programs, on the other hand, are responsible for 69 
percent of the average savings to households through a combination of reduced electricity 
expenditures and emissions. These results point to the potential gains to households from energy 
efficiency spending if the program produces results along the lines of the optimistic assumption.  
There are important questions about and limitations to our analysis, but we conclude by 
drawing attention to just two. One important limitation is the use of partial equilibrium modeling for 
what is fundamentally a general equilibrium problem. The partial equilibrium approach allows us 
greater flexibility in manipulating institutional representation in the model, but important feedbacks 
within the economy are lost to the analysis including, for example, the hidden costs associated with 
introducing new regulatory costs to the economy. A second limitation is the actual schedule of 
opportunities for energy efficiency and technological innovation. Under each of our scenarios that 
assume optimistic or pessimistic outcomes, we assume a constant return to scale for these endeavors. 
In fact, efficiency or technology could exhibit increasing cost, but through learning by doing and 
other factors, it could alternatively exhibit decreasing costs. Moreover, the examination of these 
technological possibilities on a piecewise basis rather than in an integrated technological model 
introduces the opportunity for double counting of emissions reductions opportunities. While concerns 
about returns to scale arguably introduce bias in any direction, the possibility for double counting is 
likely to bias our cost estimates downward. In any event, this illustrates one more way in which the 
cost of climate policy to households is uncertain. 
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